We recalibrate den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey's matching model to capture our preferred specification of 'turbulence', modelled in terms of the transition dynamics of human capital after voluntary and involuntary job losses. Under our calibration, an increase in turbulence increases the unemployment rate and the duration of unemployment while leaving the inflow rate into unemployment roughly unchanged, mirroring features of European data in the 1980s and 1990s.
Introduction
den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2001) (hereafter referred to as dHHR) used a matching model to study the effects of interest rates and TFP growth on unemployment rates and rates of job creation and destruction. While their main purpose was to focus on the effects of interest rates and TFP growth, they also used their model to perform an interesting reexamination of our hypothesis that increased microecononomic turbulence has interacted with generous European unemployment benefits to raise equilibrium unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s. Here we focus only on this interesting ancillary aspect of dHHR's paper.
We inject Ljungqvist and Sargent's (1998) hypothesis of increased microeconomic turbulence into dHHR's matching model, recalibrate it in what we think is an appropriate way, and show how boosting turbulence increases equilibrium unemployment, just as it does in Ljungqvist and Sargent's (1998) search model. Our findings differ substantially from those of dHHR, who used their model to challenge the robustness of our attribution of high European unemployment to the way that increased microeconomic turbulence in the 1980s and 1990s interacted with generous unemployment compensation. Wrestling with dHHR's challenge helps clarify the economic forces driving our earlier results, illustrates how those forces come through in either a matching or a search environment, and shows how dHHR disrupted those forces by making a very different assumption than we did about the dynamics of human capital deterioration in turbulent times.
The key assumption underlying our analysis in both the search environment of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and the present dHHR matching environment is that in the 1980s and 1990s laid off workers were subject to greater shocks to their earnings potential than they had been earlier. dHHR's inability to reproduce our findings in their matching framework hinges on their specifying that in turbulent times, layoffs and voluntary job moves are both subject to instantaneous skill loss, while we specify that only layoffs are. In dHHR's analysis, skill losses at the time of voluntary job terminations play a key role in making an increase in economic turbulence reduce the unemployment rate. High-skill workers' concerns about the skill losses associated with both voluntary and involuntary job separations depress the inflow rate into unemployment.
If we take dHHR's model but restore our original assumption that layoffs but not quits trigger possible instantaneous skill losses, then the matching framework supports our explanation for the outbreak of high European unemployment. Further, our calibration of dHHR's model under our version of the turbulence assumption is consistent with a roughly constant inflow rate into unemployment, a dramatic increase in the average duration of unemployment, and a hazard rate of leaving unemployment that falls with the duration of unemployment, all of which are features of the European data.
Setup
Here is a brief statement of dHHR's environment. Time is discrete. Workers have either high (j = h) or low (j = ) skill. Each previously employed low skill worker faces a probability γ U of an upgrade to the high skill level. Worker-firm pairs produce output z each period. At formation, a skill-j worker and newly matched firm jointly draw z from c.d.f. ν j (z) where ν h (z) < ν (z) for z in the interior of its support (so that z h firstorder stochastically dominates z ). For an ongoing match, with switch probability γ S , the match takes a new draw of z from ν j . If no switch occurs, z remains unchanged.
With probability ρ x , the match exogenously breaks up. Workers face a probability ρ r of expiring (or euphemistically, 'retiring'), and a measure ρ r of new workers arrives each period. Bargains maximize the joint surplus (they are efficient). Nash bargaining with weight π on the worker determines the division of the match surplus. New matches are formed according to a standard matching function that is homogeneous of degree one in the measures of unemployed workers and firms posting vacancies. Since the total measures of workers and firms are both assumed to be exogenously given and equal to one, it follows that the ratio of the measure of unemployed to the measure of vacancies is also fixed at unity and hence, the matching probability λ w is a constant. 1 Each period, unemployed workers of skill j receive unemployment benefits b j = φp j , where p j denotes the mean wage payment of all workers of skill class j. Key objects in a stationary equilibrium of the model are w j (b), a skill-j worker's future value from entering the unemployment pool in the current period when he receives unemployment benefit of b; w f , the firm's future value from entering the vacancy pool in the current period; τ e (x), the tax rate on income earned in a match when income is x; and τ u (x), the tax on unemployment benefits of x. Table 1 contains alternative settings of key parameters, which we discuss next.
Reproduction of dHHR's counterexample
The first column of Table 1 contains the parameterization of the welfare state that dHHR use to study the potential role of turbulence in explaining high European unemployment. The first three columns of Table 2 reproduce dHHR's numerical findings on how the equilibrium unemployment rate varies with turbulence and the discount factor. In their model, the unemployment rate falls rather than rises with economic turbulence. As shown in panel (a) of Figure 1 , the falling unemployment rate is due to the declining share of unemployed workers who entered unemployment from high-skill employment. In turbulent times, high-skilled workers are reluctant to seek better jobs in response to productivity shocks because they fear becoming unskilled if they quit. In fact, when the turbulence parameter γ D exceeds 0.24, high-skill workers never enter unemployment. (Recall that dHHR set ρ x = 0 as shown in our Table 1 , i.e., there are no exogenous layoffs.)
Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows how the inflow rate into unemployment plummets in response to turbulence in dHHR's model while the average duration of unemployment remains approximately constant. But the European data described by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) display a constant inflow rate and a rising duration of unemployment. Our recalibration of dHHR's model will revise its implications about these features of the data as well as about the effects of turbulence.
Modified model
We now replace dHHR's assumption with our preferred assumption that laid off workers but not quitters are subject to the risk of instantaneous skill loss upon job separation. This reflects our vision that victims of layoffs, not quitters, are the unlucky ones. We see quitters as people who are secure in their skills and inspired to change jobs to take advantage of evident opportunities to make better use of their current skills. Hence, in our modification of dHHR's model, degradations in skills happen only in connection with exogenous job breakups that occur with probability ρ x .
Instead of dHHR's equations (15) and (18), our specification makes the joint surplus for a high-skilled worker become
while the continuation value of a match involving a high-skilled worker becomes
To study the effects of turbulence in the modified model where only laid off workers are exposed to the risk of instantaneous skill loss, we must change dHHR's parameterization that has no layoffs in the welfare state (ρ x = 0). In our choice of parameter value for ρ x , we follow dHHR when they postulate quarterly layoff rates of around 1% for the laissez-faire economy. Given the modified model with ρ x = 0.01 and otherwise a parameterization identical to dHHR's original values in Table 1 , the last three columns of Table 2 report how the equilibrium unemployment rate varies with turbulence and the discount factor. Now increases in turbulence no longer reduce unemployment. Thus, dHHR's result about the effects of turbulence comes completely from their having locked high-skilled workers into their jobs through their fear of losing skills whenever they voluntarily quit to seize other jobs.
But now comes a key question: where is our hypothesized positive relationship between turbulence and unemployment? The answer is to be found in the parameterization of skills and earnings.
Parameterization of skills and earnings
Let us first recall some things about the parameterizations of skills and earnings in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) . It takes a long time to build up the highest level of skills in our model, but not in dHHR's. In our model, it takes on average 7 years and 8 months to make the transition from the lowest to the highest skill level, conditional upon no job loss.
We assume that the highest skill level has twice as much human capital as the lowest skill level.
2 The earnings of an employed worker are the product of his wage and his current skill level. At the beginning of each job, the wage is drawn from a wage offer distribution that is common to all workers. A laid off worker receives generous unemployment compensation that is equal to 70% of his lost earnings. A feature that was absent from Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) is the probability of a productivity switch on the job. However, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002) extend the framework to include this dimension. They choose this probability so that the average time between new productivity draws on the job is 1.9
years.
The parameterization of dHHR is quite different. Transitions from low to high skills take on average only 1 year and 8 months, conditional upon no job loss, γ U = 0.15.
Moreover, the differences in parameter values between the two skill groups reported in Table 1 and portrayed in panel (a) of Figure 3 are quite small. Both skill groups draw productivities from uniform distributions with only a minor difference in means, E(z l ) = 0.8 and E(z h ) = 1.0, and with the same high standard deviation, σ z = 3.838/ √ 12. New productivities on the job are also drawn from those distributions, and this can be expected to happen very frequently, more often than every four months, γ S = 0.8. That is, the reward to staying unemployed and holding out for a good job are dubious under dHHR's parameterization, since a productivity draw will on average last less than four months.
Unemployed workers receive unemployment compensation equal to 50% of the average wage in their skill category.
The second column of Table 1 contains our proposal for bringing the parameterization of the matching model more into line with the calibration of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) .
We choose a quarterly probability of upgrading skills γ U = 0.03 so that it takes on average around 8 years to move from low skills to high skills, conditional upon no job loss. The 2 We thank Dan Hamermesh for conversations about his data explorations of wage-experience profiles. Our assumption that work experience alone can double a worker's earnings seems to line up well with data for full-time male workers in the U.S. manufacturing industry. But the time required to attain such earnings gains are longer than what we assume and hence, much longer than dHHR's assumption.
high-skill workers draw productivities from a distribution with a mean that is twice as high as that for low-skill workers. The standard deviation of the uniform distributions remains identical across skill groups, but now at the lower level
of Figure 3 depicts our choice of distributions; it clearly separates the skill groups. We reduce the probability of a productivity switch on the job to γ S = 0.1, so that a worker on average keeps his productivity 2.5 years. We increase the replacement rate to 70% but keep dHHR's assumption that benefits are calculated on the basis of the average wage in a skill category.
Turbulence revisted
Given the modified model and the new parameter values in Table 1 , we compute how the equilibrium unemployment rate varies with turbulence and the discount factor. Table   3 shows that with our choice of parameters, the matching model delivers our positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the amount of turbulence. The explanation is the same as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) , namely that high-skilled workers who have been laid off and suffered a skill loss find it difficult to find jobs that they would like to accept. Table 4 reports that their hazard rate of gaining employment falls to 7% as com- It is instructive to return to why the original analysis of dHHR cannot reproduce these results. Outcomes hinge on their assumption that both layoffs and voluntary job moves are subject to the risk of instantaneous skill loss. Turbulence then closes down the voluntary reallocation of high-skilled workers because of their fear of losing skills if they quit to look for better jobs. As can be seen in Table 4 , the job destruction rate among high-skilled workers falls to zero in turbulent times for dHHR's original model while the destruction rate is unaffected by turbulence in our modified model.
To consider some further aspects of dHHR's model and ours, the destruction rate among low-skilled workers increases sharply in dHHR's model, while it remains roughly unchanged in our modified version of their model. The reason is that in dHHR's framework the value of becoming a high-skilled worker diminishes in turbulent times and low-skilled workers choose to seek better jobs in response to productivity switches rather than "sitting out" and hoping for an upgrade to the high-skill level. An obvious manifestation of the lower return to skill upgrades in the dHHR model is that the average wage of high-skill workers is actually lower than the average wage of low-skill workers in turbulent times, 0.58 versus 0.59. But of course, high-skill workers are still better off because they never experience any unemployment, while low-skill workers circle in and out of unemployment, with unemployment benefits equal to 50% of their average wage. It should be noted that the total unemployment rate in dHHR's analysis is not much affected by variations in the incidence of unemployment among low-skilled workers, since these workers constitute only 3-4% of total employment because of the assumed high probability of skill upgrades (γ U = 0.15). This returns us to our second criticism of the dHHR's analysis, namely, their parameterization of skills and earnings does not capture the long-term aspect of skill investments and fails to reflect plausible differences in earnings potentials between skill groups.
Concluding comments
Our idea that the higher European unemployment of the 80s and 90s came from increased microeconomic turbulence seems robust to the choice of theoretical framework. In the search model of Sargent (1998, 2002) and in our recalibrated version of dHHR's matching model, high unemployment erupts in a welfare state with generous benefits when laid off workers are subject to increased turbulence with respect to their earnings potential. Both models attribute the increase in equilibrium unemployment to an increase in the average duration of unemployment but keep the inflow rate into unemployment roughly unchanged -features that also characterize the European unemployment experience in the 1980s and 1990s.
The idiosyncracies of individual workers are at the core of our analyses. Heterogeneity is manifested by a hazard rate of leaving unemployment that falls with the duration of unemployment, a salient feature of European labor markets. dHHR limit individual heterogeneity somewhat when they make their assumptions that the job offer arrival rate is the same for all of unemployed workers and that unemployment benefits are based on the average wage within a skill class. Besides letting benefits be a replacement rate times an individual's own lost earnings, Sargent (1998, 2002) let individuals choose the search intensities that affect job offer arrival rates and thereby offer an explanation for the phenomenon of disillusioned workers who withdraw from labor market participation.
We believe that incorporating a richer structure of ex post heterogeneity among workers would improve the ability of dHHR's framework to account for the European unemployment experience. For a discussion of why the aggregate unemployment rate in Europe seems to require focusing on the idiosyncracies of individual workers and a critical assessment of alternative theories based on "representative families", see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002) . given in the first column of our Table 1 . ‡ The modified model refers to the framework where laid off workers but not quitters are subject to instantaneous skill loss. The parameter values are given in the first column of Table 1 except that we now set ρ x = 0.01. Table 1 and the discount factor is 0.97.) Table 1 and the discount factor is 0.97.)
